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Abstract: This paper explores how the preservation of  socioemotional wealth can be manifested in the
control and corporate governance of  Malaysian Chinese firms. Using panel data from the Industrial
Products index of the Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) during 2003-2006, we show that the
ingrained ‘life-raft values’ among overseas Chinese entrepreneurs can be associated with the preservation
of  their socioemotional wealth, and thus they prioritize control over their firms. Additionally, we confirm
the monitoring role of non-dominant large shareholders in reducing the families’ influence in managing
and enhancing their firms’ performance. Specifically, control contestability exercised by the non-domi-
nant large shareholders mediates the relationship between a family’s involvement in management and their
firm’s performance.
Abstrak: Makalah ini membahas bagaimana pelestarian kekayaan sosioemosional dapat diwujudkan dalam
kontrol dan tata kelola perusahaan dari perusahaan China Malaysia. Menggunakan data panel dari indeks
Industri Produk dari Bursa Malaysia selama 2003-2006, menunjukkan bahwa mendarah-daging 'hidup-
nilai rakit' antara pengusaha Cina di luar negeri dapat dikaitkan dengan pelestarian kekayaan sosioemosional
mereka, sehingga mereka memprioritaskan kontrol atas perusahaan mereka. Selain itu, kami mengkonfirmasi
peran monitoring pemegang saham besar non-dominan dalam mengurangi kinerja keluarga 'pengaruh
dalam mengelola dan meningkatkan perusahaan mereka.' Secara khusus, kontrol contestability dilakukan
oleh pemegang saham besar non-dominan yang memediasi hubungan antara keterlibatan keluarga dalam
manajemen dan kinerja perusahaan mereka.
Keywords: corporate g overnance; family fi rms; large shareholders; life-raft values;
socioemotional wealth
 JEL classification: G30, G32
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Introduction
A contention of the socioemotional
wealth concept is that family firms rely on a
pivotal reference point, namely socioemo-
tional wealth, in decision-making (Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011).
In this regard, family owners view their busi-
ness enterprises as a means to achieve family
affective needs in which the preservation of
the family’s welfare and emotional satisfac-
tion becomes the main objective of the fam-
ily businesses. That is, the non-economic di-
mension of socioemotional wealth pre-empts
profit maximization as the ultimate objective
of  the family businesses.
The researchers in the areas of family
businesses generally acknowledge that fam-
ily firms are distinctive business entities be-
cause they are not exclusively driven by eco-
nomic objectives (Sirmon and Hitt 2003;
Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011; Berrone et al. 2012;
Siebels and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012).
While the preservation of  socioemotional
wealth may not become the pivotal point of
decision-making in family firms, familial ori-
entations and agendas tend to be reflected in
the owner-managed firms (Miller et al. 2011).
In other words, owner-managed firms tend
to prioritize control of  the firm to protect their
socioemotional wealth. By contrast, family
firms with a separation of  ownership and
control tend to be more entrepreneurially ori-
ented. In this regard, there is a knowledge gap
in understanding the reaction of family own-
ers to avoiding losing control of  their firms
due to the threat of non-dominant sharehold-
ers (Schulze and Gedajlovic 2010).
Most recent studies into overseas eth-
nic-Chinese businesses have mainly focused
on ‘familism’ in the business’ structure and
Chinese culture (Wijaya 2008; Carney and
Gedajlovic 2002; Bertrand and Schoar 2006).
Chinese-ethnic business enterprises generally
prioritize kinship ties in raising capital, hir-
ing managers and adopt a family-centric man-
agement style. Yet, despite the extensive lit-
erature on overseas Chinese businesses, very
little research has directly examined the in-
teraction between family owners and non-
dominant large shareholders, which in turn
may affect the firms’ performance. This
knowledge void is interesting because the
presence of multiple large shareholders in an
ownership structure can be a powerful coali-
t ion to monitor and exercise control
contestability over family owners in family
firms (Attig et al. 2009; Gutierrez and Pombo
2009; Goh et al. 2014).
Thus, this study intends to fill the
knowledge void by examining the preserva-
tion of  socioemotional wealth in family firms
with regard to the firms’ control in overseas
Chinese family firms. We examine how fam-
ily owners react to the control contestability
exercised by non-dominant large sharehold-
ers. We propose that overseas Chinese family
firms with the ingrained ‘life-raft values’ of
Chinese family businesses can be explained
by the preservation of  the socioemotional
wealth. To the best of  our knowledge, this
study represents the first attempt to bridge
the gap between the socioemotional wealth
and ‘life-raft values’ in Chinese family busi-
nesses.
This paper focus on overseas Chinese
in Malaysia (henceforth Malaysian Chinese)
because we considered that the institutional
context is an important determinant in shap-
ing the culture and management style for
overseas Chinese businesses. In general, the
Malaysian economic system is regarded as a
state-directed economy. Malaysian Chinese
entrepreneurs are discontent with the corpo-
rate ownership restrictions imposed by the
New Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia
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(Gomez 2009). In addition, the establishment
of state-owned enterprises under the NEP
has threatened the dominant ownership po-
sition of Malaysian Chinese entrepreneurs in
the corporate sectors. Thus, this hostile busi-
ness environment provides an excellent em-
pirical setting to examine the preservation of
socioemotional welfare among Malaysian
Chinese entrepreneurs. Specifically, we chose
the Malaysian Chinese businesses in the
manufacturing sector for two reasons. Firstly,
we argue that capital intensive manufactur-
ing firms may induce close monitoring or in-
tervention by their non-dominant large share-
holders to prevent the appropriation of the
firms’ assets by the family owners. Secondly,
the NEP has restricted the Malaysian Chi-
nese entrepreneurs in their attempts to in-
crease their ownership in newly established
manufacturing firms (Gomez 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section reviews the relevant
literature and develops the hypotheses. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the dataset and the solution
methods. The main results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
Literature Review and
Hypotheses Development
Preservation of  Socioemotional
wealth in Family Firms
Family firms are widely recognized as
unique business entities because they are not
exclusively driven by economic objectives
(Dyer 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). In the
view of  the uniqueness of  family firms,
Gómez-Mej ía et al . (2007) proposed a
Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) framework to
explain the myths of decision-making in fam-
ily firms. The main assumption of  SEW is
that a family firm relies on its perceived prime
reference point for any major decision-mak-
ing. SEW explains that the family owners
emphasize the family’s welfare and emotional
attachments over economic utility in family
firms. Stated differently, preservation of  the
SEW can be interpreted as the preservation
of  the family’s utility function that includes
the family’s welfare and emotional attach-
ments. Thus, the risk profile of  the family
owners is contingent upon protecting their
socioemotional wealth.
Family Involvement
in Management and Firm
Performance
In general, family owners can influence
business strategies and decision-making be-
cause they are the dominant controlling share-
holders in the firms. Nevertheless, family in-
fluences may differ across family firms due
to the different degrees of family involve-
ment in management (Shanker and Astrachan
1996) and thus the family’s emotional com-
ponents are also not uniformly identical.
Berrone et al. (2012) explain that family firms
with strong influences and the families’ in-
volvement in management tend to prioritize
their socioemotional wealth. This can be seen
from the family’s involvement in manage-
ment, through the appointment of the family
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in family
firms. This is also consistent with the view
that family involvement in management tends
to reflect familial orientations and agendas
in family firms (Miller et al. 2011).
Family involvement in management of-
ten leads to family owners having strong con-
trol over the firm through two sources of
power. Firstly, the appointment of  family
CEOs gives ultimate control to the family
owners of  the firms’ decision-making. Be-
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cause the CEO is the highest formal posi-
tion within the hierarchical organization, fam-
ily CEOs are less likely to rely on support
from other members of the management team
in controlling the firm (Finkelstein 1992).
Additionally, the CEO (or management) is
better positioned to have knowledge and con-
trol of  the firm’s informational material
(Mace 1972). Thus, family CEOs can exert a
significant influence over outside directors
who rely on the disclosed information to per-
form any independent monitoring. Another
example is that the family owners may opt
for a CEOs duality leadership structure,
through the appointment of family members
to be the CEO and the chairman of  the board
of  directors to fully control the firm and its
management (Adams, Hermal in, and
Weisbach 2010).
Secondly, family owners can enhance their
control of  the firm through their dominant
ownership position in the ownership struc-
ture. The ownership power defined here is
the power delegated to managers to manage
the business on behalf  of  the shareholders.
In family firms, the structural power of  fam-
ily managers is enhanced by their ownership
power and thus they have a strong influence
over the firms’ decision-making (Daily and
Johnson 1997). Furthermore, high ownership
power enables family CEOs to attenuate the
monitoring role of the board of directors by
reducing the board’s  independence
(Finkelstein 1992). In this regard, Jones et al.
(2008) explain that family firms are reluctant
to lose control of  the firm in order to pre-
serve the SEW; therefore, family firms gen-
erally have higher trust and relational ties with
affiliated directors and are unlikely to cede
control to the board.
As noted above, family owners derive
their strong control from their structural and
ownership powers. The power in the firm’s
structure is, therefore, polarized when the
family owners become involved in manage-
ment. However, excessive power could fa-
cilitate the expropriation of minority share-
holders by family owners who prioritize the
SEW’s preservation, i.e., firm resources are
utilized to safeguard family interests rather
than maximize the firm’s value. This is also
known as Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts
(Jiang and Peng 2011). In this regard, firms’
assets and resources are subject to appropria-
tion by the family owners. For example, their
dominant position enables the family owners
to determine profit sharing schemes and the
business’ structures to serve their personal
interests (Claessens and Fan 2002). This is
known as ‘tunnelling resources’ and can be
exhibited through transfer pricing, unfairly
high compensation packages for manage-
ment, engaging in non-arms length transac-
tions (La Porta et al. 2002) and paying out
high dividends (Chen et al. 2009). In turn,
the stock market may discount the market
value of  family firms because of  heightened
concerns when the controlling shareholders
are exposed to more incentives to expropri-
ate minority shareholders (Young et al. 2008).
In line with the previous arguments,
prior empirical studies have shown that the
expropriation of minority shareholders is
prevalent in emerging economies (Wahab et
al. 2011; Chen et al. 2009; Liew 2007). For
instance, Chen et al. (2009) show that con-
trolling shareholders utilize money raised
during the initial public offering and rights
issue to pay dividends based on self interest
objectives in China. Similar evidence is also
found in Malaysia. Wahab et al. (2011) dis-
covered that announcements of related party
transactions by firms had discounted these
firms’ market performance in Malaysia. Simi-
larly, Liew (2007) discovered that corporate
practitioners perceived that the expropriation
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of the minority shareholders by the control-
ling shareholders was prevalent in Malaysia.
The weak enforcement of  the rules and regu-
lations in Malaysia also increases the risk of
the expropriations of minority shareholders
by the controlling shareholders (Porta et al.
1998; Friedman et al. 2003). The correspond-
ing testable hypothesis is thus:
H
1
: Family involvement in management is negatively
related to the firms’ performance.
Preservation of  Socioemotional
Wealth and Control Contestability
Large control contestability stemming
from the non-dominant large shareholders in
the ownership structure signifies a threat to
the family owners of losing control of the
firm. Although the corporate takeover mecha-
nism is generally restricted by high ownership
concentrations in emerging economies (Porta
et al. 1999), we suggest that corporate take-
overs may be feasible if the non-family large
shareholders have a higher proportion of the
shares. The rationale is that the non-family
large shareholders do not need to purchase
shares aggressively in a limited supply mar-
ket (Burkart et al. 1998). Stated differently, a
group of  large shareholders can form a coali-
tion to initiate a takeover of  a firm at a lower
cost. For example, in Malaysia, the Business
Times (2013) reported that a coalition of four
large shareholders of Bright Packing Berhad
managed to remove the dominant family
shareholders, who owned about 30.58 per-
cent of the voting rights, from the board of
directors.
In Malaysia, Malaysian Chinese entre-
preneurs have been discriminated against
since the implementation of the NEP in
1971. The NEP is an affirmative action policy
to restructure corporate ownership so that
Bumiputera, non-Bumiputera and foreign in-
vestors can hold 30 percent, 40 percent and
30 percent corporate ownership respectively
(Yasuda 1991). The Bumiputera in the NEP
policy mainly refers to the ethnic-Malay group
in Malaysia (Tam and Tan 2007). To do so,
the Malaysian government enacted the Indus-
trial Coordination Act of 1975 (ICA 1975)
to increase the Bumiputera ownership in the
corporate sector by restricting non-
Bumiputera and foreign equity ownership in
new manufacturing establishments (Yeung
1999). Needless to say, Malaysia Chinese
entrepreneurs are fearful of losing corporate
ownership (or control) because the NEP
policy is hostile towards non-Bumiputera eth-
nic groups. Thus, Malaysian Chinese entre-
preneurs must resort to family members in
their business operations according to their
ingrained ‘life-raft values’ (Carney and
Gedajlovic 2002). In turn, control over their
firms becomes a means for Malaysian Chi-
nese entrepreneurs to achieve security in a
hostile environment (Kao 1993). These ar-
guments centre on the overseas Chinese en-
trepreneurs view of the business enterprise
as a ‘familial life raft’ and they have a strong
preference to sustain the status quo of the
family firms through maintaining control over
the firms. Stated differently, the preservation
of  their control of  the firms becomes the piv-
otal point in Malaysian Chinese family busi-
nesses and thus they are reluctant to liqui-
date their equity shares. In turn, the voting
rights of the non-dominant large sharehold-
ers are restricted since it is expensive to ac-
quire more of the limited freely floating shares
on the open market.
Putting these ideas together, we believe
that control rights are the single most impor-
tant instrument for family owners to shield
them from the threats from other large share-
holders. In other words, control over the firm
is the pivotal point for Malaysian Chinese
Goh et al.
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owner-managed fi rms to protect their
socioemotional wealth. Similar arguments can
be detected in recent empirical studies that
show that family owners incorporate emo-
tional values into their control over their firms
(Zellweger et al. 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al.
2007). For instance, Gómez-Mejía et al.
(2007) investigated family choices about con-
trol in 1237 Spanish family firms with olive
oil mills for a 53-year sample period. They
showed that the higher degree of family in-
volvement in the ownership and control sig-
nified greater SEW attachments among the
family owners. Thus, the Spanish family own-
ers viewed the preservation of  their SEW to
be a prime reference point in their business
operations and they were willing to accept
lower levels of  performance from their firms,
and a higher probability of their businesses
failing, to preserve their control over their
firms. In a similar vein, Zellweger et al. (2012)
provided corroborating evidence by showing
that the family owners perceived their equity
shares to have a higher fair value compared
to the market’s perceived fair value in Swit-
zerland and Germany. Zellweger et al. (2012)
concluded that family owners, who intended
to have transgenerational control, asked for
significant premiums on their equity shares.
Based on the above arguments, we propose
the following hypothesis:
H
2
: Family involvement in management is negatively
related to the control contestability in the own-
ership structure stemming from non-dominant
large shareholders.
Thus far, we have argued that the pres-
ervation of  socioemotional wealth translates
into lower control contestability in the own-
ership structure. Nevertheless, the control
contestability exercised by non-dominant
large shareholders can enhance corporate
governance in family firms. An implication
of this line of reasoning is that family orien-
tation in family-controlled firms may be sup-
pressed by the monitoring of non-dominant
large shareholders. The intervention of  non-
dominant large shareholders in the family’s
agenda can be manifested in two ways.
First, the presence of large sharehold-
ers may actively engage in firms’ monitoring
with lower costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
Previous empirical studies have shown insti-
tutional investors can influence the corporate
investment decisions in technology-based
firms (Le et al. 2006; Kor 2006). For example,
Le et al. (2006) showed that institutional
ownership positively moderated the relation-
ship between a firm’s R&D investment and
the firm’s performance. This implies all types
of  firms are likely to experience stringent
monitoring and intervention because institu-
tional investors are equipped with oversight
skills (Le et al. 2006).
Second, large shareholders may intervene
in designing the compensation packages for
family managers. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003)
showed that compensation packages for fam-
ily firms differed to those of  non-family firms
in the United States. Specifically, family own-
ers are reluctant to issue stock options to non-
family executives to avoid diluting control of
the firm. The compensation package for fam-
ily CEOs is also designed to be insulated from
systematic business risks. This can be inter-
preted as family owners intending to protect
family managers in family-controlled firms.
Meanwhile, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) also
showed that the presence of institutional in-
vestors discouraged the issuance of stocks
for family CEOs to prevent family owners
strengthening their controlling position. Thus,
familial orientations in compensation pack-
ages were restricted by the monitoring of large
shareholders.
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Based on these explanations, our view
is that control contestability in the ownership
structure enhances corporate governance and
thus enhances the performance of  family
firms. Thus, the control contestability will
subsequently mediate the relationship be-
tween family involvement in management
and the firms’ performance. We submit the
following hypothesis.
H
3
: The control contestability in the ownership struc-
ture stemming from non-dominant large share-
holders mediates the relationship between the
family’s involvement in management and the
firm’s performance.
Methods
Sample and Data Collection
Our dataset covers 112 Malaysian Chi-
nese firms listed in the Industrial Products
index on the Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian
stock exchange). The selected firms are clas-
sified as manufacturing firms in the indus-
trial products industry, based on the industry’s
definition by Bursa Malaysia. We obtained
ownership information, corporate gover-
nance; and family relations for substantial
shareholders and directors from the annual
reports. Financial data and market equity
prices were collected from Datastream.
To identify Malaysian Chinese family
firms, we relied on a 10 percent cut-off  of
voting rights (Claessens et al. 2002) as the
threshold to identify the ultimate controlling
shareholders. We regarded ownership by all
the family members as a single controlling
entity (Claessens et al. 2002). Because mul-
tiple controlling shareholders may be present
in the ownership structure, we only selected
Malaysian Chinese family firms where the
Chinese family owners appeared to be the
largest shareholders.
We purposely chose the sample period
from 2003 to 2006 because it was a stable
economic period, to reduce potential bias in
the market-based performance measures (He
and Wang 2009). The rationale is that mar-
ket investors may be irrational when eco-
nomic shocks unfold, such as during a finan-
cial crisis, and subsequently depress the mar-
ket equity prices and cause unstable perfor-
mance by firms (Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011).
In total, our sample comprises of  448 firm-
year observations over the four years.
Finally, our chosen sample period offered
a setting where governance variables could
be assumed to be exogenous with respect to
firms’ performance. Such a sample period is
important because the rapidly changing own-
ership patterns may lead to reverse causality
(Claessens et al. 2002; Gassen 2014). The
ownership structure in Malaysia has largely
remained unchanged between 2000 and 2008
(Carney and Child 2013; Claessens et al.
2002), so we can rule out the reverse causal-
ity of governance variables from 2003 to
2006 in this study.
Measurements
A Partial Least Square-Structural Equa-
tion Modelling (PLS-SEM) was used to per-
form the statistical tests for the proposed
hypotheses in this study. The structural equa-
tion modelling was appropriate because some
corporate governance and financial variables
were difficult to observe directly (Azim 2012;
Lin 2005; Johnson and Greening 1999). For
example, we used a two-item construct to
measure control contestability, family in-
volvement in management, capital structure,
firms’ investment and firms’ size in this study
and thus mitigating the measurement errors
problems. We used SmartPLS 2.0 in the
model’s estimation and results evaluation
(Ringle et al. 2005). We followed the two step
Goh et al.
266
approach for reporting the PLS-SEM results
to assess the measurement model and the
structural model (Chin 2010).
In this study, a single-item measure is
used for several constructs including firms’
performance, ownership concentration and
board independence. This single-item con-
struct had been utilized in prior corporate gov-
ernance studies that employed the PLS-SEM
method when there were no latent variables
available (Berthelot et al. 2012; Li et al. 2006).
Diamantopoulos et al. (2012) suggest that the
single-item construct (or concrete construct)
should be used when there is only one, if not
holistically one, attribute being represented.
In this regard, the attribute of the variables
such as firms’ performance, ownership con-
centration and board independence is con-
crete and can be measured by the single-item
construct.
First, the firm’s performance construct
was the market-to-book ratio. The firm’s mar-
ket value was the market value of the com-
mon stock and the book value of preferred
shares and debt, whereas the book value was
the total assets. Claessens et al. (2002) and
Young et al. (2008) suggested that the mar-
ket-based valuation was appropriate to mea-
sure the firm’s performance in emerging econo-
mies because market investors would discount
the fair value of the shareholdings based on
the concerns of  principal-to-principal conflicts.
Second, ownership concentration was the
voting rights of the largest shareholder in the
selected Malaysian Chinese firms (Liew et al.
2011; Grosfeld 2009; Tam and Tan 2007).
That was, the ownership concentration was
also the voting rights owned by the Malay-
sian Chinese family owners in their family
firms. We included ownership concentration
because it was regarded as an incentive for
shareholders to engage in monitoring the firm
and its management.
Third, board independence was the pro-
portion of independent directors on the
board. The independent directors were in-
cluded because they were expected to inde-
pendently monitor the firm’s management
(Adams et al. 2010).
Several multiple item constructs were
regarded as latent variables in this study. First,
control contestability was measured by two
items that reflected the construct: (i) the ratio
of the voting rights of the second largest share-
holder to the voting rights of the largest share-
holder, and (ii) the ratio of the pooled voting
rights of the second to fifth largest sharehold-
ers to the voting rights of the largest share-
holder (Attig et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2013).
Second, family involvement in manage-
ment construct was measured by two items
reflecting the construct: (i) the family CEO
and (ii) the CEO-chairman’s duality. This con-
struct was used to reflect the preservation of
the socioemotional wealth in family firms
where the family had direct involvement in the
firm’s management (Berrone et al. 2012;
Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). Kowalewski et al.
(2010) and Peng and Jiang (2010) suggest that
family CEOs can be used to measure the de-
gree of family involvement in management.
The CEO-chairman’s duality is also included
because family firms may attempt to safeguard
their family’s interests by appointing family
members as the CEO and Chairman of  the
board of  directors (Tam and Tan 2007).
Third, capital structure, firms’ invest-
ment, firms’ size are included as controlling
constructs. Capital structure was measured by
two items: (i) the ratio of the total debt to the
total assets and (ii) the ratio of the total debt
to the total common shares (Luo et al. 2013;
Chen et al. 2011). Likewise, the firms’ invest-
ment construct was measured by two items:
(i) the capital expenditure divided by the to-
tal assets and (ii) the capital expenditure di-
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vided by the total sales (King and Wen 2011;
Cheng 2008). The firms’ size (the book value
of  the firms’ assets and the firms’ sales) was
included to control the economic advantages
derived from the firms’ resources (Demsetz
and Lehn 1985).
Finally, year variables were included to
control the time effects (Gutierrez and Pombo
2009). Because our sample period covers four
years, three dummy variables (2004, 2005 and
2006) were included whereas 2003 was ex-
cluded.
Empirical Results and
Discussions
Measurement Models
Table 1 demonstrates the descriptive
analysis for the observed variables in this study.
The observed variables are the items that were
measured by the constructs in the PLS-SEM.
According to Hair et al. (2011), reflective
measurement models in the PLS-SEM are
assessed through indicator reliability, inter-
Constructs/indicators Mean Minimum Maximum 
Firm performance     
Market-to-book ratio 0.71 0.10 7.29 
Ownership concentration     
Voting rights of the largest shareholder  37.67 11.58 71.98 
Family involvement in management     
Family CEO 0.73 0.00 1.00 
CEO Duality 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Control contestability     
The ratio of the voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder to the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder  
0.31 0.01 1.00 
The ratio of the pooled voting rights of the 
second to fifth largest shareholders to the 
voting rights of the largest shareholder 
0.68 0.02 2.49 
Board independence     
Proportion of independent directors on the 
boards  
0.40 0.00 0.83 
Capital structure     
Ratio of total debt to total assets 0.26 0.00 1.48 
Ratio of total debt to total common shares  0.65 0.00 14.86 
Firm investment    
Capital expenditure divided by total assets 0.05 0.00 0.41 
Capital expenditure divided by total sales  0.08 0.00 1.09 
Firm size    
Firm assets (in RM million) 286.57 12.74 3965.16 
Sales (in RM million) 336.54 24.40 3275.21 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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nal consistency reliability, convergent valid-
ity and discriminant validity. Based on our
analysis, all the indicator loadings in the re-
flective constructs achieved 0.743 and higher,
which exceeds the minimum threshold value
of 0.70 stipulated for the indicators’ reliabil-
ity (Hair et al. 2011) (see Table 2). Similarly,
we noticed all the composite reliability results
are higher than the minimum threshold value
of  0.7, which demonstrates all the construct
measures achieved the required internal con-
sistency reliability (Hair et al. 2011). The
Average Variable Extracted (AVE) for all the
constructs was 0.690 and higher, which ex-
ceeds the threshold value of 0.5, providing
evidence of convergent validity (Hair et al.
2011). Finally, we used Fornell-Larcker’s cri-
terion to assess the discriminant validity of
the constructs. Our results show all the con-
structs have achieved discriminant validity
because the square root of  the AVEs was
higher than all the inter-construct correlations
(see Table 3) (Hair et al. 2011). In summary,
our assessment shows that the measurement
models in this study were reliable and valid.
Constructs/Indicators Notation Loading Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
Firm performance      
Market-to-book ratio MB 1 1 1 
Ownership concentration      
Voting rights of the largest shareholder  Conc 1 1 1 
Family involvement in management      
Family CEO FIM 0.782 0.816 0.690 
CEO Duality  0.877   
Control contestability      
The ratio of the voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder to the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder  
Contest 0.977 0.981 0.963 
The ratio of the pooled voting rights of the second to 
fifth largest shareholders to the voting rights of the 
largest shareholder  
0.985 
  
Board independence  Bind 
   
Proportion of independent directors on the boards  
 
1 1 1 
Capital structure  
    
Ratio of total debt to total assets Lev 0.977 0.857 0.753 
Ratio of total debt to total common shares  
 
0.743 
  
Firm investment 
    
Capital expenditure divided by total assets CAPEX 0.946 0.950 0.905 
Capital expenditure divided by total sales  
 
0.957 
  
Firm size 
    
Firm assets Size 0.997 0.934 0.878 
Sales 
 
0.872 
  
Year 2004 2004 1 1 1 
Year 2005 2005 1 1 1 
Year 2006 2006 1 1 1 
 
Table 2. Measurement Model Evaluation Results
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Structural Model
In estimating the significance level of
the path coefficient, we used a bootstrapping
procedure (448 cases and 5000 samples), a
no-sign changes option and a path weighting
scheme. The assessment of goodness-of-fit
was not required in the structural model of
the PLS-SEM (Chin 2010). Nevertheless, the
model validity of the PLS-SEM was exam-
ined through a predictive relevance (Q-
squared), to indicate the degree of predictive
relevance at the indicator level, i.e., how well
the model can sufficiently predict the indica-
tors of  the endogenous constructs (Hair,
Ringle, and Sarstedt 2011). As a general rule
of  thumb, the predictive relevance must be
greater than zero for the endogenous con-
structs in the model (Hair et al. 2011). In es-
timating the predictive relevance, we used a
blindfolding procedure to obtain the Q-
Squared of  the endogenous constructs (Hair
et al. 2011).
Figure 1 and Table 4 show the results
of  the structural model estimations without
a mediator (i .e., control contestabil ity).
Clearly, our results show that the predictive
relevance (Q-squared) is above zero (i.e.,
0.031), supporting the model’s validity. In-
terestingly, our results show that family in-
volvement in management has a positive and
statistically significant (p<0.01) relationship
with the firms’ performance (see Table IV),
thus hypothesis H
1
 is not supported. That is,
our results show that the market exhibits a
positive view of the Malaysian Chinese
owner-managed firms, although corporate
practitioners perceived that the expropriation
of minority shareholders by the controlling
shareholders is prevalent in Malaysia. This can
be explained by the fact that strong control
over their firms enable Malaysian Chinese
family owners to be directly involved in such
negotiations, and contract enforcement is
weak in the Malaysian context because of the
weak legal institutional settings (Claessens
and Fan 2002). Thus, the positive impact of
the aforementioned family involvement in
management outweighs the appropriation
concerns of  the firms’ resources in the Ma-
laysian Chinese owner-managed firms.
Family Involvement
in Management
Firm Performance
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Independence



0.087***
0.169***
0.058
Note: ***/**/* significant at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 error level respectively; control variables are included but not
presented in this figure
Figure 1. Structural Model without Mediator (Model 1)
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Table 5 and Figure 2 show the results
of  the full path model with the mediator. The
results show that the families’ involvement
in management has a negative and statisti-
cally significant relationship (p<0.01) with
control contestability (see Table 5), thus hy-
pothesis H
2
 is supported. Additionally, con-
trol contestability in the ownership structure
has a positive relationship (p<0.01) with
firms’ performance.
With regard to the mediation analysis,
we observed that the path coefficient of  fam-
ily involvement in management and firms’
performance changes from 0.087 (p<0.01) in
Model 1 to 0.101 (p<0.01) in Model 2. Fol-
lowing guidelines by Baron and Kenny
(1986), we concluded that the control
contestability exhibits a partial mediating role
on the relationship between the families’ in-
volvement in management and their firms’
performance. We also performed the Sobel
test and found that the mediating effect of
control contestability is statistical signifi-
cance at the 1 percent error level (i.e., Sobel
test-statistic =-3.085) and thus provided sup-
port for H
3
 (see Table 6). Our results show
that the indirect effects of family involvement
in management on the firms’ performance via
the mediator construct (i.e., control contest-
ability) is -0.045 whereas the total effects of
family involvement in management on the
firms’ performance is 0.056 (see Table 6).
These results support our contention that the
non-dominant large shareholders suppress
family orientations in the owner-managed
firms. Family owners in owner-managed firms
also tend to restrict the control contestability
stemming from the non-dominant large share-
holders to preserve their socioemotional
wealth. However, the presence of non-domi-
nant large shareholders can induce effective
monitoring of the family owners in family
firms.
Table 5 shows that the ownership con-
centration has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant relationship (p<0.01) with firms’
performance. This result contradicts prior
studies that used a broad-based sample (i.e.,
without distinguishing the ownership types)
when investigating the relationship between
the ownership concentration and firms’ per-
formance in Malaysia (Tam and Tan 2007;
Liew et al. 2011). One explanation is that the
ownership concentration is the main driver
of Malaysian Chinese entrepreneurs to com-
mit to family businesses because their wealth
is linked to these firms’ performance. On the
other hand, our results indicate that board
Table 4. PLS Structural Model Results of  Model 1 (without mediator)
Endogenous Constructs R2  Q2 
MB 0.071  0.031 
Relation Path Coefficient Std. Errors t-Value 
Conc→MB 0.169*** 0.040 4.252 
FIM→MB (H1) 0.087*** 0.033 2.616 
Bind→MB 0.058 0.099 0.583 
LEV→MB 0.103 0.063 1.632 
CAPEX→MB -0.093*** 0.034 2.716 
Size→MB -0.125** 0.056 2.235 
 
Note: ***/**/* denotes 1%/5%/10% error levels; year variables are included but not presented in the table.
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Endogenous Constructs R2 
 
Q2 
MB 0.086 
 
0.046 
Contest  0.063 
 
0.057 
Relation Path coefficient Std. Error t-Value 
Conc → MB  0.292*** 0.051 5.670 
FIM → Contest (H2) -0.252*** 0.040 6.349 
FIM → MB (H1) 0.101*** 0.032 3.130 
Contest → MB 0.177*** 0.050 3.530 
Bind → MB 0.070 0.098 0.719 
LEV → MB 0.119* 0.064 1.862 
CAPEX → MB -0.095*** 0.033 2.886 
Size → MB -0.147** 0.059 2.501 
 
Table 5. PLS Structural Model Results of  Model 2 (with mediator)
Note: ****/**/* denotes 1%/5%/10% error levels; year variables are included not presented in the table.
Note: ***/**/* significant at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 error level respectively; control variables are included but not
presented in this figure
Figure 1. Structural Model without Mediator (Model 1)
Firm Performance
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Independence



0.101***
0.292***
0.058
Family Involvement
in Management
Contestability of
large sharholders

 -0.252***
0.177***
Source Construct Target Construct = Firm Performance 
 
Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect 
Family involvement in management 0.056 0.101 -0.045 
 
Table 6. Analysis of  Mediating Effects
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independence yields a non-significant effect
on the firms’ performance. The findings could
be attributed to the dominant position of the
family owners, who regard outside directors
as a source for advice and counselling, but
not for monitoring. Additionally, independent
directors may receive weak institutional sup-
port in performing their monitoring of  the
firms in Malaysia (Peng 2004; Porta et al.
1998).
The control variables show few inter-
esting findings (see Table 5). The results sug-
gest that the firms’ investments have a nega-
tive and statistically significant relationship
(p<0.01) with the fir ms’ perfor mance,
whereas the firms’ leverage shows a positive
and statistically significant (p<0.10) relation-
ship. In addition, the firms’ size has a nega-
tive and statistically significant relationship
(p<0.05) with firms’ performance. These re-
sults suggest that although investors are gen-
erally positive about the use of  the firms’ le-
verage in business operation, they are scepti-
cal about management in regard to the firms’
size (sales and assets) in Malaysian Chinese
firms. One potential explanation is that big-
ger firm sizes may be attributed to the higher
capital expenditure, which may not translate
into higher profit margins. Malaysian Chinese
entrepreneurs who emphasize the value of
security may adopt conservative investment
strategies in lowering the firms’ investment
risks rather than maximizing the firms’ value
(Au and Kwan 2009).
Conclusion
This paper explores how the preserva-
tion of socioemotional wealth can be mani-
fested in the control and corporate gover-
nance of  Malaysian Chinese firms. The find-
ings are as follows. First, we showed that fam-
ily involvement in management exhibits a
positive relationship with the firms’ perfor-
mance. Second, control contestability stem-
ming from non-dominant large shareholders
mediates the relationship between the fami-
lies’ involvement in management and the
firms’ performance. Third, the market per-
ceives non-dominant large shareholders as a
monitoring mechanism of family controlling
shareholders in Malaysian Chinese firms.
Overall, we show that Malaysian Chinese
entrepreneurs prioritize their control in owner-
managed firms because they want to preserve
their socioemotional wealth. We interpret
that Malaysian Chinese entrepreneurs, who
operate under a hostile business environment,
prioritize their control of  their firms. Thus,
‘life-raft’ values’ are still held by Malaysian
Chinese entrepreneurs in owner-managed
firms.
This paper makes three contributions to
the literature. First, it sheds light on how
socioemotional wealth can be manifested in
the control and corporate governance of  firms
in a transition economy. Because the socio-
emotional wealth in family firms has been
largely studied in advanced economies, it may
be interesting to explore this issue in emerg-
ing economies with hostile business environ-
ments in state-directed economies. Specifi-
cally, socioemotional wealth suggests family
owners prioritize their families’ interests, but
we found that the benefits of family involve-
ment in management outweighed the appro-
priation concerns of  the firms’ resources in
Malaysian Chinese owner-managed firms.
Second, we provide evidence that in-
grained ‘life-raft values’ among overseas Chi-
nese entrepreneurs can be associated with the
preservation of  their socioemotional wealth.
Stated differently, this study represents the
first attempt to offer the linkage between
socioemotional wealth and ‘life-raft values’
in overseas Chinese family businesses.
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Third, this study represents the first at-
tempt to show that control contestability
mediates the relationship between family in-
volvement in management and firms’ perfor-
mance.
Finally, this study was to some extent
limited by the hostile business context for
Malaysian Chinese family firms. It is conceiv-
able to suggest that family businesses are af-
fected by institutional environments and cul-
tures with regard to the preservation of
socioemotional wealth. Future research can
be extended to family businesses in other
emerging and advanced economies to inves-
tigate the reactions of family owners in re-
sponse to the threat of non-dominant large
shareholders to their control of  their firms.
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